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Introduction
On January 23, 2012 the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) con-
firmed charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta accusing
him of committing crimes against humanity.1  Article 7 of the Rome Stat-
ute, which established the ICC, defines crimes against humanity as specific
“acts . . . committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”2  President
Kenyatta was accused of committing crimes against humanity for acts of
† J.D., Cornell Law School, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Ndulo for all his
help in creating this Note.  I would also like to thank my family for their unending
support in all of my endeavors.
1. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, ¶ 428 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543
.pdf.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2178
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape, persecution,
and other inhumane acts.3
President Kenyatta is alleged to have participated in widespread and
systematic attacks for the purpose of keeping the Party of National Unity in
power.4  Specifically, he is alleged to have taken part in planning and exe-
cuting attacks on a civilian population perceived as supporting the Orange
Democratic Movement in Nakuru and Naivasha between November 2007
and January 2008.5  The attacks resulted in rape, severe physical injuries,
mental suffering, destruction of property, the displacement of thousands of
people, and “a large number of killings.”6
The ICC set a provisional trial commencement date of February 5,
2014.7  As the trial date drew closer, however, it became clear that there
were weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.  Accordingly, on December 19,
2013, the prosecution moved for an adjournment to “undertake additional
investigative steps.”8  In response, the defense filed a motion to adjourn
and terminate the proceedings based on insufficiency of the evidence.9  On
January 23, 2014, the ICC adjourned the case indefinitely in order to con-
sider the requests of the parties.10
The ICC’s considerations revolved around the principle of ne bis in
idem,11 otherwise known as double jeopardy.  The ICC invited written sub-
missions by the parties after the defense raised the issue during a status
conference.12  The prosecution argued that any consideration of double
jeopardy was premature, stating that “[t]he principle could conceivably
come into play only if the charges were withdrawn, and the case is not at
that state yet.”13  The defense responded that in light of the prosecution’s
weak evidence, “[t]he Accused must be formally acquitted . . . and pro-
tected from further trial before the Court with respect to the alleged con-
duct that has formed the basis of the charges pursuant to principle of ne bis
3. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, supra note 1, at ¶ 428. The
constituent acts of crimes against humanity that are specified in the Rome Statute
include murder (Article 7(1)(a)), deportation or forcible transfer of population (Article
7(1)(d)), rape (Article 7(1)(g)), persecution (Article 7(1)(h)), and other inhumane acts
(Article 7(1)(k)).
4. ICC, Case Information Sheet: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor




7. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Order Vacating Trial Date, ¶
1 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1716620.pdf.
8. Id. ¶ 2.
9. Id. ¶ 3.
10. Id. ¶ 6.
11. Translates to “not twice for the same.”
12. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Submissions on
the ne bis in idem Principle, ¶ 3– 4, (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1724937.pdf.
13. Id. ¶ 2.
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in idem.”14
Ne bis in idem is enshrined in Article 20 of the Rome Statute.15
Although the ICC ultimately rejected the defense’s request, the conse-
quences would have been great if the reverse occurred; the ICC would have
been barred from any subsequent prosecution of President Kenyatta.16
What is unclear, however, is whether a state or a different international
tribunal would also be barred from prosecution.  Double jeopardy con-
cerns in international criminal law can be viewed through different dimen-
sions, namely (1) whether prosecution by a state bars prosecution by
another state; (2) whether prosecution by an international tribunal bars
prosecution by another international tribunal; and (3) whether prosecution
in an international tribunal bars subsequent prosecution by a state.17  This
Note will focus on the latter question.
Part I will discuss the principles and underlying concerns of ne bis in
idem and double jeopardy.  It will outline the dual sovereign exception to
double jeopardy.  Part II will discuss double jeopardy under the Rome Stat-
ute.  Part III of this Note will argue that the international legal personality
of international tribunals derived from state sovereignty bars state prosecu-
tion of a defendant after a prosecution by an international tribunal.
I. Double Jeopardy
A. The Underlying Policy of the Protection Against Double Jeopardy
The protection against double jeopardy can be traced back to ancient
Roman law.18  The rule against double jeopardy is “a ‘cardinal’ principle
that lies ‘at the foundation of criminal law,’” and is “viewed as one of the
central principles underpinning both the protection of individual human
rights and the fair administration of justice.”19  Double jeopardy, at its
core, is “the idea that a person should not be tried more than once for the
same offense.”20  This basic idea is found in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which provides that “no person shall be . . .
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”21
14. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Defense Response to the
‘Prosecution Submissions on the ne bis in idem Principle,’ ¶ 11, (Feb. 17, 2014), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1734226.pdf.
15. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20.
16. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s
Application for a Finding of Non-Compliance Pursuant to Article 87(7) and for Adjourn-
ment of the Provisional Trial Date, ¶ 99 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/doc/doc1755190.pdf.
17. The third question can be stated conversely as whether domestic state prosecu-
tion bars subsequent prosecution by an international tribunal.
18. Lorrain Finlay, Does the International Criminal Court Protect Against Double Jeop-
ardy: An Analysis of Article 20 of the Rome Statute, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221,
223 (2009).
19. Id. at 222– 23.
20. Id. at 223.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The rule against double jeopardy serves two main functions: to protect
the individual and to ensure the integrity of the justice system.  Justice
Black explained the double jeopardy rule’s role in protecting the individual
in Green v. United States.22  He observed,
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him
to live in a continuing sense of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.23
The risk is that with repeated prosecutions, a defendant faces a higher like-
lihood of being convicted, even if he or she is innocent.  The defendant’s
increased probability of being convicted has two primary sources.  First,
the defendant may not have the stamina or resources to maintain a contin-
ued defense. Furthermore, the government also would gain the tactical
advantage of learning the defendant’s theories and evidence at the first
trial.24
Additionally, the double jeopardy rule enhances the integrity of the
judicial system.  Specifically, the rule reflects the importance of finality
and helps protect against inconsistent results.25  In this sense, “the doc-
trine plays a role in upholding public confidence in the justice system and
respect for judicial proceedings, with the additional practical benefit of
conserving judicial resources.”26  The rule also ensures the need for thor-
ough investigations and prosecutions by the state because it will only have
one shot at conviction.27
B. Double Jeopardy in the International Context
These basic policies are at the foundation of double jeopardy rules
across the world.  Over fifty national constitutions recognize the basic pro-
tection against double jeopardy.28  Even states that do not have a constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy often have a statutory or
common law rule barring successive prosecutions by the state.29  Never-
theless, although there is widespread acceptance of the principle, “its pre-
cise scope and application varies considerably across jurisdictions.”30
22. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
23. Id. at 187– 88.
24. Jennifer E. Costa, Double Jeopardy and non bis in idem: Principles of Fairness, 4
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 181, 185 (1998) (“With each new trial, the prosecution
gets more practice with the case.  Also, there is a risk that innocent individuals will wear
down and tire of fighting to prove their innocence, if forced to prove it again and
again.”).
25. Finlay, supra note 18, at 223. R
26. Id. at 223.
27. Id. at 223– 24.
28. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 292 (1993).
29. Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional
Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 817 (2009).
30. Finlay, supra note 18, at 225. R
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The double jeopardy protection in the United States is more limited in
scope than in other common law countries.31  Canada and England, for
example, have a broader protection against double jeopardy, where succes-
sive prosecutions are barred if a foreign “court of competent jurisdiction”
has already tried a defendant32  The United States, by contrast, would not
bar a subsequent prosecution.33
Civil law countries, where double jeopardy is referred to as ne bis in
idem, are similarly split.34  Germany and Italy fall closer to the United
States in not prohibiting successive prosecutions based on foreign adjudi-
cation, whereas Dutch law applies the rule found in Canada and
England.35  No country except the Netherlands, however, permits a claim
of double jeopardy where the act has taken place within the country’s terri-
tory.36  Some states, such as Belgium, will consider its interest in prosecut-
ing the crime when determining whether to allow a double jeopardy
claim.37  While all countries seem to embrace the core principle of protec-
tion against double jeopardy, the exact contours of each jurisdiction’s treat-
ment of the principle vary significantly.
Treaties paint a clearer picture.  The protection against double jeop-
ardy has been enshrined in a number of universal human rights agree-
ments, including the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).38  It is also found in various regional human
rights agreements, including the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Freedoms (ECHR),39 the American Convention on
Human Rights,40 and the revised Arab Charter on Human Rights.41  In
addition, the protection against double jeopardy exists in international
humanitarian law, such as in the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.42  Finally, protection against double
jeopardy is found in international criminal tribunals such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),43 the Interna-
31. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 817– 18.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 773.
34. Costa, supra note 24, at 182. R
35. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 818. R
36. Id.
37. Id. at 819.
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(7), opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
39. Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. 117 (entered into force
Nov. 1, 1988) [hereinafter ECHR].
40. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(4), July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
41. Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 19, Aug. 5, 1990.
42. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 86, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
43. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
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tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),44 and the ICC.45
These treaties show that, at the very least, states agree that the protec-
tion against double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions by a
single sovereign.46  Article 14(7) of the ICCPR states, “No one shall be lia-
ble to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of each country.”47  Professor Colengelo observed that “the lan-
guage of the provision seems to suggest [that] the prohibition on double
jeopardy applies only within ‘each’ state’s judicial system,” and thus “the
scope of Article 14(7)’s double jeopardy protection is limited to multiple
prosecutions by one state.”48  Focusing not on the treaty’s limits but its
objectives, the ICCPR is an endorsement of the idea that a single sovereign
may only prosecute a defendant for an offense once.
Professor Colengelo argued further that “[r]egional human rights
instruments containing a bar on double jeopardy likewise limit its applica-
tion to multiple prosecutions by a single state.”49  Article 4 of Protocol 7 to
the ECHR states, “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in
criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an
offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.”50  The Council
of Europe’s Explanatory Report has made clear that Article 4 applies to
successive prosecutions by a single sovereign.51  The treaties therefore all
consistently stand for the proposition that the protection against double
jeopardy prohibits successive prosecutions by a single sovereign.
Likewise, there is similar agreement in international humanitarian
law.  Adopted unanimously, Article 86 to the Geneva Convention III states,
“No prisoner may be punished more than once for the same act of the same
charge.”52  The drafting history shows that Article 86 was meant to address
the abuses committed during World War II, when states would increase
punishment in response to a defendant exercising his or her right to appeal
or petition a sentence.53  Viewed within the circumstances of its adoption,
Article 86 is meant to bar successive prosecutions by a single sovereign.54
44. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (June 29, 1995).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20.
46. See Colangelo, supra note 29, at 774 (“Human rights and humanitarian law
instruments guarantee a right against double jeopardy, but only from successive prose-
cutions by a single state.”).
47. ICCPR art. 14(7).
48. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 806– 07.
49. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 807.
50. ECHR, art. 4.
51. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe
.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/117.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
52. Geneva Convention III, art. 86.
53. Commentary to Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Aug. 12, 1949), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590105?OpenDocu
ment.
54. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 808– 09. R
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C. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy
An important exception to the protection against double jeopardy is
the doctrine of dual sovereignty. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine even
if a defendant has already been convicted or acquitted the defendant may
be tried again for the same offense.  Two separate sovereigns may each
prosecute a defendant for an act that violates the laws of both.55  In the
United States, “the dual sovereignty doctrine denies [double jeopardy] pro-
tection in three circumstances: (1) successive prosecutions of an individual
by multiple state governments; (2) successive prosecutions of an individual
by a state and the federal government; and (3) successive prosecutions of
an individual by a state or the federal government and a foreign govern-
ment.”56  The justification for the dual sovereignty exception is that each
entity derives its sovereignty from an independent source and must be per-
mitted to protect its interests through enforcement of its criminal law.57
The dual sovereignty exception was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court to protect principles of federalism.  The Supreme Court
was concerned that an expansive reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause
would bar either the federal government or individual state governments
from enforcing their respective criminal laws.58  The Court in Moore v. Illi-
nois explained,
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.  He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punish-
ment for an infraction of the laws of either.  The same act may be an offence
or transgression of the laws of both. . . .That either or both may (if they see
fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted.59
Thus, a defendant may be convicted and punished by both the federal gov-
ernment and a state government for the same act.
The doctrine of dual sovereignty also allows successive prosecutions
by different states for the same act.  The Supreme Court stated in Heath v.
Alabama that “[t]he States are no less sovereign with respect to each other
than they are with respect to the Federal Government.”60  The Court went
on to observe that a “State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign authority
through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by
another State’s enforcement of its own laws.”61  The dual sovereignty doc-
trine in the United States, therefore, can be understood to allow both hori-
zontal prosecutions between states and vertical prosecutions between a
state and the federal government.
55. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136 (1958).
56. Erin M. Cranman, Comment, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy:
A Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right?, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
1641, 1642 (2000).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1654.
59. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 20 (1852).
60. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985).
61. Id. at 93 (emphasis omitted).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that successive prosecutions
for the same offense by the same sovereign are prohibited by the protection
against double jeopardy.62  This idea is consistent with the consensus of
international agreements prohibiting successive prosecutions by the same
sovereign.  The Court has said that this rule is absolute, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant even if a judge has ruled
incorrectly.63
Because the protection against double jeopardy only bars successive
prosecutions by the same sovereign, it is important to define the term “sov-
ereign.”  The Supreme Court has stated that the question of whether two
entities are separate sovereigns “turns on whether the two [prosecuting]
entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of
power.”64  The Court explained that “the sovereignty of two prosecuting
entities for [double jeopardy] purposes is determined by the ultimate
source of the power under which the respective prosecutions were
taken.”65  Thus, whether the dual sovereign exception applies will turn on
whether two entities have the same “ultimate source of power.”
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the definition of the “ultimate
source of power.”  Two entities are separate sovereigns when “each has the
power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be
an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing
so each is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”66  The
Court further stated that “[f]oremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty
is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.”67  Professor Colangelo
explained that “an entity is ‘sovereign’ when it has the power— indepen-
dently— (1) to determine what shall be an offense, and (2) to punish such
offenses.  And when it exercises these powers, it exercises its own sover-
eignty, not that of other sovereigns.”68
This definition of sovereignty has led to some important limitations to
the dual sovereign doctrine.  Importantly, for double jeopardy purposes, a
state and its municipalities are considered the same sovereign.69  A state
and its municipality cannot benefit from the dual sovereignty doctrine, and
are barred from prosecuting an individual for the same offense.70  In hold-
ing that states and municipalities are the same sovereign for double jeop-
ardy purposes, the Court emphasized that “[p]olitical subdivisions of
States— counties, cities or whatever— never were and never have been con-
sidered as sovereign entities.  Rather, they have been traditionally regarded
as subordinate government instrumentalities created by the State to assist
62. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
63. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68– 69 (1978).
64. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88.
65. Id. at 90.
66. Id. at 89– 90.
67. Id. at 93.
68. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 780.
69. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394– 95 (1970).
70. Id.
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in the carrying out of state governmental functions.”71  Thus, in consider-
ing whether the dual sovereignty doctrine applies, the Court has placed a
particular emphasis on whether a prosecuting entity is only a subordinate
instrumentality created to facilitate governmental functions.
Likewise, the federal government and its territories are considered the
same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.72  In finding that the Philip-
pines and the federal government could not benefit from the dual sover-
eignty doctrine, the Court observed that “[t]he government of a state does
not derive its powers from the United States, while the government of the
Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United States, and its judicial
tribunals exert all their powers by the authority of the United States.”73
These cases make clear that if an entity derives its sovereignty from another
entity, then those entities are likely to be considered the same sovereign for
double jeopardy purposes.
The dual sovereignty doctrine is similar in the international context.
Successive prosecutions by independent sovereign states are analogous to
the successive prosecutions by states under the horizontal dual sovereignty
doctrine in the United States.  As discussed above, some countries con-
tinue to engage in successive prosecutions despite a conviction or acquittal
by a foreign court.74  State practice shows the absence of an international
double jeopardy rule and that “the non bis in idem rule, which is stated and
applied in domestic law, is far from being accepted as a general principle of
law in international relations.”75
Application of human rights treaties has reinforced the validity of the
horizontal dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy.  The Human
Rights Committee, which is responsible for interpreting and implementing
the ICCPR,76 considered the dual sovereignty doctrine in A.P. v. Italy.77  In
that case, an Italian citizen was charged with money laundering in both
Switzerland and Italy.78  The Committee agreed with Italy’s argument that
Article 14(7)’s double jeopardy provision “must be understood as referring
exclusively to the relationships between judicial decisions of a single State
and not between those of different States.”79  The dual sovereignty excep-
tion to the protection against double jeopardy is thus applicable in both the
domestic and international context.  Of particular importance is the appli-
cation of the protection against double jeopardy in the ICC.
71. Id. at 392 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)).
72. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
73. Id. at 354.
74. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 817– 19.
75. Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 1281,
1296.
76. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
77. A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, Report of the Human Rights
Comm., 43d Sess., supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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II. The ICC
A. Double Jeopardy Criticism
The establishment of the ICC was highly controversial.  Critics were
concerned that the ICC could be used to pursue politically motivated cases
while failing to provide adequate due process protections.80  One of the
main due process concerns was the protection against double jeopardy.
One critic stated:
Virtually all the organizations, whether international, governmental, or non-
governmental, that have rallied to the ICC cause go to great pains to stress
that the Rome Statute offers all the due process protections of the American
Constitution and, more specifically, that it provides protection against
double jeopardy.  This is simply and obviously not so.  Indeed, if the expres-
sion ‘double jeopardy’ is understood in the ordinary sense of American law
and, more generally, the common law tradition, then not only does the stat-
ute not provide protection against double jeopardy; it also positively sanc-
tions exposing defendants to double jeopardy.81
While the Rome Statute does provide a degree of protection against double
jeopardy, it has been the subject of much criticism.
B. Statutory Framework
The double jeopardy protection in the Rome Statute is found in Article
20 “Ne bis in idem,” which provides:
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the
Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which
the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article
5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the
Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also pro-
scribed under article 6, 7, or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the
same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from crimi-
nal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accor-
dance with the norms of due process recognized by the international law
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was incon-
sistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.82
Article 20(1) provides the most straightforward application of the
double jeopardy rule.  It provides that a person who has already been tried
before the ICC may not be tried again before the ICC for the same con-
duct.83  Interestingly, the 1994 Draft Statute did not include this provision
because it was “understood to be a self-evident principle.”84  This seems to
80. Finlay, supra note 18, at 222. R
81. John Rosenthal, A Lawless Global Court: How the International Criminal Court
Undermines the U.N. System, 123 POL’Y REV. 29, 33 (2004).
82. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20.
83. Id. at 20(1).
84. Finlay, supra note 18, at 228– 29. R
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strengthen the proposition that the double jeopardy rule consistently bars
successive prosecutions by the same sovereign.
The “same conduct” provision affords broad protection to an individ-
ual, while the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution
only protects against multiple prosecutions for the “same offense.”85  The
basic test for whether two crimes constitute the “same offense” is to deter-
mine if either crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not.86
Lesser and greater included offenses, therefore, constitute the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes.87  In other words, “[s]tatutory violations
involving a single act are the same offense, unless each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”88  By contrast, the
same conduct test would protect against successive prosecutions regardless
of the elements of the specific crimes charged, so long as the prosecutions
were based on the same act.89
Article 20(2) has been subject to particularly harsh criticism.  It is far
weaker than the protection in Article 20(1) because it only provides double
jeopardy protection for the type of “crime” referred to in Article 5.90  It
therefore “protects an individual who has been convicted or acquitted by
the ICC from being subsequently placed on trial by another court only for
the specific offenses for which he has already been convicted or acquitted
by the ICC.”91  As such, after an individual is convicted or acquitted by the
ICC, Article 20(2) does not prevent another court from subsequently
charging that individual for an offense other than one specifically listed in
Article 5.92  Additionally, Article 20(2) does not prevent another court
from charging an individual with a crime listed in Article 5 when he or she
has been convicted or acquitted by the ICC for a different Article 5 crime.93
The crime-based approach provides significantly less protection than
the conduct-based approach.  The crimes listed in Article 5 require specific
forms of intent with respect to the constitutive acts that make up the
crime,94  so “[i]mposing a conduct-based ne bis in idem prohibition under
Article 20(2) would mean that an individual who is tried by the ICC and
acquitted of genocide on the basis that the required intent was not proven
85. Helvering v. United States, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
86. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
87. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977).
88. Costa, supra note 24, at 187. R
89. Linda E. Carter, The Principle of Complementarity and the International Criminal
Court: The Role of ne bis in idem, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 165, 178 (2010).
90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(2).  The crimes listed in Article 5 are geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.  Rome Statute,
supra note 2, art. 5.
91. Finlay, supra note 18, at 229. R
92. Id. at 229– 30 (explaining that “[t]his means . . . that an individual who is acquit-
ted of genocide by the ICC may still be tried by a national court for the murders that
formed the basis of the original genocide charge.”).
93. Id. at 230 (explaining that “[i]t may be possible . . . for an individual who is
charged with genocide before the ICC and acquitted to be subsequently tried by a
national court (or any other international tribunal) for crimes against humanity.”).
94. Id. at 231.
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by the Prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt would subsequently be
immune from punishment for any individual acts of killing, rape, torture,
kidnapping and the like.”95  Because Article 20(2) does not, however, pro-
vide for a conduct-based approach, an individual may still be subject to
subsequent prosecution in national courts for any of the individual acts of
an Article 5 crime after conviction or acquittal by the ICC.  Although
strong policy reasons support this limitation,96 it exists at the expense of
the individual’s protection against double jeopardy.
Article 20(3) returns to the broader double jeopardy protection, once
again employing the conduct-based test.97  In effect, it provides that an
individual tried at the national level may not be tried in the ICC for a crime
based on the same underlying conduct.98  The main idea behind this provi-
sion is that states should have primacy in conducting their own prosecu-
tions.99  In order to minimize abuse, however, Article 20(3) has two
important exceptions.
First, Article 20(3)(a) provides that the ICC may still prosecute an
individual when the national court proceedings “[w]ere for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”100  This
exception was created to deal with “sham trials” that imposed a nominal
punishment on the accused in order to bar subsequent prosecution under
the conduct-based test.101  This exception permits the ICC to prosecute an
individual for crimes against humanity if he or she was convicted of mur-
der in a national court for the same conduct but received a relatively low
sentence.
Second, the ICC may try an individual after a national court prosecu-
tion when those proceedings “were not conducted independently or impar-
tially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by
international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circum-
stances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.”102  Like the first exception, Article 20(3)(b) is meant to permit the
ICC to determine the adequacy of the prior proceedings and decide
whether the “full measure” of justice has been done.103
III. International Law Bars Successive International and National
Prosecutions
A. The Legal Personality of International Criminal Tribunals
Criticism of the ICC raises serious concerns about the double jeop-
ardy protection that the court affords to individuals.  Of particular concern
95. Id. at 232.
96. Id. at 232.
97. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(3).
98. Id.
99. Finlay, supra note 18, at 234. R
100. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(3)(a).
101. Finlay, supra note 18, at 235. R
102. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(3)(b).
103. Finlay, supra note 18, at 234. R
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is Article 20(2), which arguably allows states to subsequently try a defen-
dant who has been convicted or acquitted by the ICC.  Although risk of
subsequent prosecution may be low, the potential for abuse cannot be
ignored, “particularly given that investigation and prosecution by the ICC
could itself potentially alter the political considerations that weigh upon a
country’s decision to take action in response to alleged crimes of this
nature.”104  Commentators have suggested that Article 20(2) should
employ the conduct-based approach.105  Given, however, that Article 20(2)
expressly uses a crime-based approach, relying on another rationale in
order to bar successive prosecutions would be preferable.
The proposition that a national court may prosecute an individual
after a conviction or acquittal in an international tribunal assumes that the
dual sovereignty theory applies.  This theory conceives of the relationship
between national courts and international tribunals as one of vertical dual
sovereignty, which accordingly allows for successive prosecutions.  This
assumption, however, ultimately raises questions regarding the “sovereign”
status of the international tribunal: is the tribunal a separate sovereign
from the nation for double jeopardy purposes, or is an international tribu-
nal the same sovereign as the nation?  Conceptually, the question is
whether the relationship between an international tribunal and a nation is
more like the relationship between the United States federal government
and the individual states, or more like that between a state and a munici-
pality.  This section argues that because international tribunals derive their
international legal personality from nations, the dual sovereignty exception
does not apply to successive prosecutions by an international tribunal and
a nation, and the protection against double jeopardy would thus apply.
First, it is important to determine how international law treats the
relationship between international criminal tribunals and nations.  Two
main theories address the international legal personality of non-state enti-
ties.  The first is the implied powers doctrine.106  This doctrine provides
that “states impliedly conferred on the organization the international legal
personality needed to carry out the functions assigned to it consistent with
the purposes and principles specified in the legal instrument creating
it.”107  The second is the inherent powers doctrine.  This doctrine main-
tains that once an entity is bestowed with international legal personality, it
may act apart from those powers expressly or impliedly given to it by the
states.108  Under either theory, however, “the ultimate power over interna-
tional organizations remains with states, if, for no other reason, than that
states may always choose to dissolve an international organization that
they have created.”109
104. Id. at 232.
105. Id. 229– 31.
106. James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21st Cen-
tury, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 6 (1997).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
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There are various theories dealing with the source of a non-state’s
international legal personality.  One of these is the legal traditionalist
approach.110  This theory holds that sovereign states have primacy over all
other international actors.111  The primacy of states “places full interna-
tional legal personality, in the first instance, in states in the sense that
states are the ultimate source for rights, duties, privileges and immunities
under traditional international law.”112  In this sense, non-state entities
derive their international legal personality from the sovereignty of the
states.113  The international legal personality “must be discernibly trans-
ferred from states to the non-state entity through some legal instru-
ment.”114  Importantly, under this theory, international non-state entities
are treated “no differently than non-state entities are treated under munici-
pal law, at least as to the legal source of their rights and duties.”115  While
there are other theories concerning the source of international legal per-
sonality, the source “for non-state entities in the twenty-first century ought
to continue to be derived from states . . . .”116
The relationship between the legal traditionalist approach and interna-
tional criminal tribunals is illuminating.  First, following the crux of the
doctrine, the source of any international criminal tribunal is the sovereign
authority of the states to create the tribunal.  The tribunal thus derives its
power wholly from the states through some legal instrument, such as a
treaty.  Second, the powers of the tribunal are defined and limited by the
scope of the agreement between states.  Thus, an international criminal
tribunal “is not the same thing . . . as a State, which it certainly is not, [nor
are] its legal personality and rights and duties . . . the same as those of a
State.”117  Likewise, an international criminal tribunal is limited to func-
tions that are assigned to it by the state signatories of its founding treaty.
Here, the Rome Statute, after establishing that the ICC has international
legal personality, states in Article 4 that “[i]t shall also have such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfill-
ment of its purposes.”118  This is, of course, a much more limited claim of
power than would be granted to a state.  Third, the states always maintain
primacy over an international criminal tribunal because the states ulti-
mately retain the option of dissolving a tribunal.
B. The “Sovereign” in Dual Sovereignty
The United States Supreme Court has stated that two entities are sepa-
rate sovereigns if they derive their power to prosecute from distinct sources
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12– 13.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
118. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 4(1).
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of power.119  To determine if two sources of power are distinct, the Court
examines the entities’ “ultimate source of power.”120  Sovereigns draw from
separate ultimate sources of power when “each has the power, inherent in
any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against
its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so each is exercis-
ing its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”121  Accordingly, there are
three requirements to obtaining the status of sovereign.  First, the entity
must be able to determine what an offense shall be.  Second, the entity
must be able to punish the offense.  Finally, when an entity exercises these
powers, it exercises its own sovereignty, not the sovereignty of another.122
An international criminal tribunal always derives its power from the
sovereign states.  Without a discernible legal instrument that explicitly or
impliedly passes on international legal personality from a state to an inter-
national criminal tribunal, there can be no cognizable tribunal.123  This is
weakened somewhat if the inherent powers doctrine is followed, but not to
a significant extent because states must still establish a tribunal before that
tribunal can assume its inherent legal personality.  In any case, the states
could simply dissolve the tribunal, ensuring at least a requirement of tacit
consent of the states to the tribunal’s continued existence.124
The first prong of the Supreme Court’s test for whether an entity quali-
fies as a sovereign is whether that entity can define offenses; no interna-
tional legal tribunal has that power.  With regards to the ICC, the parties to
the Rome Statute defined all of the offenses over which it has jurisdiction
during the drafting,125 and there is nothing in the Rome Statute that grants
the ICC the additional power to define an offense itself.  The ICC thus fails
the first element of the Supreme Court’s test for sovereignty.  Because it
cannot define its own offenses, the ICC should not be viewed as a separate
sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.
The second element of the Supreme Court’s test for sovereignty
requires the entity to have the power to punish offenses; an important
counterpoint, then, is that the ICC does seem to have some discretion and
authority to punish the offenses over which it has jurisdiction. Article 13
lays out three situations where the ICC can punish offenses: (1) when state
party refers the crime to the ICC; (2) when the Security Council refers the
crime; and (3) when the prosecutor has initiated an investigation.126  There
are, however, important limits to the ICC’s power to punish.  First, the ICC
119. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88.
120. Id. at 90.
121. Id. at 89– 90.
122. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 780.
123. See Hickey, supra note 106, at 13 (stating that “[w]ithout that transfer, non-state R
entities should not be taken to have either international legal personality or the conse-
quent legal standing or legal capacity to assert international law rights and duties
directly in international law fora.”).
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
125. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 6– 8.
126. Id. at art. 13(a)– (c).
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can only punish the defined offenses and its jurisdiction is “limited to the
most serious crimes of concern.”127  This is unlike the typical power of a
state to punish offenses, and is unlike the type of power to punish the
Supreme Court had in mind.  The most important limitation is in Article
17, which essentially states that if a state is investigating and prosecuting
an individual, then the ICC may not exercise its jurisdiction.128  This is a
limitation that creates an impenetrable bar to the ICC’s power to punish. In
other words, there are situations where an individual has committed an
offense defined under Article 5, and the ICC would not have the power to
punish that individual.  The ICC thus fails the second element of the
Supreme Court’s sovereignty test because there are conceivable instances
in which the ICC may not punish an offense over which it otherwise has
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s third prong in its sovereignty test is whether the
entity is exercising its own sovereignty or that of another.  Because the
authority of the ICC to prosecute an individual is derivative of the state’s
authority, the ICC is ultimately exercising the sovereignty of another.
Indeed, the ICC would not have any jurisdiction to prosecute any crime if
not for the states’ grant of authority.  Even the prosecutions that the ICC
undertakes may result from a specific request by a state to initiate an inves-
tigation.  Here, the most important factor is the state referral.  Article 14
allows the ICC to conduct an investigation and prosecute an offense if a
state party refers the case.129  There is no question that the state itself
would have jurisdiction over these offenses.  By asking the ICC to conduct
the investigation and prosecution, however, the state is effectively asking
the ICC to exercise the state’s sovereignty on its behalf.  In the first
instance, the state confers the power to the ICC to prosecute crimes.  In the
second, the state asks the ICC to punish a crime that the state itself could
properly punish.  In this way, the ICC is acting essentially as an agent of
the state in its exercise of sovereignty.  For these reasons, the ICC also fails
the third element of the Supreme Court’s test for sovereignty.
C. Customary International Law
Even though the ICC and the member states should be considered the
same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes, it does not necessarily fol-
low that they are barred from successively prosecuting an individual for
the same offense.  Rather, there must be a principle in international law
that would bar successive prosecutions by the same sovereign.  In this case,
customary international law does provide such a principle.
Aside from treaty law, customary international law is the primary
form of international law.130  It is defined as a “general consistent practice
127. Id. at art. 5(1).
128. Id. at art. 17.
129. Id. at art. 14.
130. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999).
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of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”131  Customary
international law thus must meet two requirements: it must be (1) the
widespread and uniform practice of nations that (2) nations must engage
in out of a sense of legal obligation.132  The second requirement is other-
wise known as opinio juris,133 and it distinguishes what is done voluntarily
from what is done as the result of a legal obligation.134
The protection against double jeopardy satisfies both elements. First,
the protection against double jeopardy is a widespread practice.  It is incor-
porated into over fifty national constitutions.135  Even states that do not
have a constitutional rule are likely to have a statutory or common law rule
protecting against double jeopardy.136  As discussed above, the protection
against double jeopardy is also found in universal human rights treaties,
regional human rights instruments, and international humanitarian law.
The core principle of the protection against double jeopardy is thus wide-
spread and near universal.
Although the core principle of protection against double jeopardy is
widespread, its exact contours vary widely, to the point where it may be
difficult to formulate a universal rule.  While it is true that the wide variety
of state practices shows the absence of a uniform double jeopardy rule,
there is a common core in every state’s double jeopardy protection.  State
practice shows that there is generally no rule protecting against double
jeopardy in a national court subsequent to a prosecution in another sover-
eign’s national court.  Indeed, this is the principle for which the dual sover-
eign exception stands.  But the rule is different with respect to successive
prosecutions by the same sovereign.  The state practice of affording protec-
tion against double jeopardy when the same sovereign successively prose-
cutes an individual is widespread.  Therefore, if an international criminal
tribunal and a state are considered the same sovereign, then any successive
prosecutions by either of them would thus be considered a violation of the
protection against double jeopardy.  While there is no customary interna-
tional law norm prohibiting the application of the dual sovereignty excep-
tion, there is widespread state practice prohibiting the successive
prosecutions of an individual by the same sovereign.  Once two entities are
found to be under the umbrella of a single sovereign, they are subject to the
double jeopardy rule.
Even if each state accepts the general rule that a single sovereign may
not successively prosecute an individual, some may argue that the way the
rule is interpreted within each state varies too widely to form a general
practice.  This argument would suggest that there is no widespread practice
because some jurisdictions follow the “same offense”137 test and other
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (ALI 1987).
132. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 130, at 1116.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 292.
136. Colangelo, supra note 29, at 817.
137. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399.
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jurisdictions follow the broader, conduct-based test.138  This argument
fails to recognize, however, that the two tests are reconcilable.  Any double
jeopardy protection that would be afforded by the “same offense” test
would also be covered by the broader conduct-based test.  It is helpful to
think of the “same offense” test as a floor.  It is a minimum standard that
no country will go below when applying its protection against double jeop-
ardy.  Although state practice may differ statutorily, all states will at the
very least protect against successive prosecutions that are covered by the
“same offense” test.  There is therefore a general practice among states that
the double jeopardy rule protects an individual from successive prosecu-
tions by a single sovereign for at least the “same offense,” as defined by the
Supreme Court.
The final issue is whether states follow this rule out of a sense of legal
obligation.  It is very likely that the protection against double jeopardy sat-
isfies the opinio juris requirement given the ancient roots of the law and
that it is “a ‘cardinal’ principle that lies ‘at the foundation of criminal law,’”
and is “viewed as one of the central principles underpinning both the pro-
tection of individual human rights and the fair administration of jus-
tice.”139  Indeed, such a bedrock principle of criminal law is integral to any
justice system.  This is why the 1994 Draft of the Rome Statute considered
such a principle “self-evident”;140 any state would likely feel bound by
such an important and self-evident principle.  The core protection against
double jeopardy is therefore a customary international law norm.
Conclusion
This Note has argued that successive prosecutions by international
and national courts violate the protection against double jeopardy.  First, it
considered the underlying rationale for the double jeopardy rule.  To that
effect, it explained that the double jeopardy rule is important both as a
protection for the individual and as a protection for the integrity of the
justice system.  Next, it discussed the double jeopardy rule in the interna-
tional context and determined that there is an international commitment to
the core principle of the double jeopardy rule.  It then discussed the dual
sovereignty exception to the protection against double jeopardy with
respect to the laws of the United States and international laws.
This Note then considered double jeopardy in the ICC.  The ICC has
been subject to much criticism, especially in its treatment of double jeop-
ardy.  This Note has discussed that criticism and the statutory framework
to which the criticism applies.  The ICC has three main double jeopardy
protections.  The first and the third are the most expansive and provide the
greatest protections to the individual.141  The second protection, found in
138. Carter, supra note 89, at 178. R
139. Finlay, supra note 18, at 222– 23. R
140. Id. at 228– 29; see also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(1) (showing that the
“self-evident” principle was that the ICC could not prosecute an individual that it had
already acquitted or convicted).
141. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 20(1), (3).
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Article 20(2) of the Rome Statute, is the most problematic.142  This Note
discussed the particular criticism that Article 20(2) allows for a state to
prosecute an individual after an acquittal or conviction by the ICC.
With that problematic context, this Note considered whether there was
any other rule that would protect an individual from double jeopardy.  To
that end, it argued that the relationship between states and international
tribunals was such that the dual sovereignty exception does not apply.
This inquiry ultimately turns on the “sovereign” status of an international
criminal tribunal.  Because the source of an international criminal tribu-
nal’s international legal personality is derived from the sovereignty of the
states, the dual sovereign exception does not apply.  Applying the U.S.
Supreme Court’s definition of sovereignty to the dual sovereignty exception
shows that a criminal tribunal and a state are the same sovereign for
double jeopardy purposes.  Specifically, in the context of the ICC, it cannot
define its own crimes, does not have absolute power to punish offenses,
and it exercises the sovereignty of another rather than its own.
Finally, this Note argued that, at the very least, there is a double jeop-
ardy rule in customary international law that protects an individual from
successive prosecutions by a single sovereign for the “same offense.”  It
concluded that there is widespread practice among states, as evidenced by
various national constitutions, statutory rules, common law rules, univer-
sal human rights treaties, regional human rights instruments, and interna-
tional humanitarian law.  It also concluded that states follow this general
practice out of a sense of legal obligation.  Individuals should therefore be
protected from double jeopardy by successive prosecution by international
and state courts— understood as the same sovereign— for the same offense.
142. Id. at 20(2).
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